Can Pakistan champion afghan women’s rights without fixing its own?

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Pakistan’s decision to convene the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference on Afghan women’s education reflects an important diplomatic initiative. At a time when Afghan women continue to face severe restrictions on education, employment, and public life, regional engagement is both timely and necessary. As Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour and one of the country’s most directly affected by developments across the Durand Line, Pakistan has both a strategic interest and a humanitarian responsibility to advocate for greater educational opportunities for Afghan women.
Yet effective diplomacy is not measured merely by the causes a state champion abroad. It is equally shaped by the credibility it commands at home. This raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: can Pakistan successfully position itself as a normative advocate for women’s rights internationally while significant gender inequalities persist within its own borders?
International relations scholarship has long recognized that legitimacy is an essential component of state influence. Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power emphasizes that persuasion derives not simply from military or economic capabilities but from the attractiveness and credibility of a state’s values and institutions. Likewise, constructivist scholars argue that international legitimacy depends upon consistency between a state’s external commitments and its domestic practices. States seeking to shape international norms must first demonstrate adherence to those norms themselves.
Pakistan’s position illustrates this dilemma. While Islamabad rightly condemns restrictions imposed on Afghan women, millions of Pakistani girls remain outside the education system, female labour force participation remains among the lowest in South Asia, maternal health indicators continue to reveal deep inequalities, and gender-based violence persists despite legislative reforms. Honour killings, child marriages, workplace harassment, and barriers to political participation remain persistent structural challenges rather than isolated incidents.
Acknowledging these realities does not diminish the suffering of Afghan women, nor should it discourage Pakistan from raising their plight in international forums. Human rights are universal, and silence in the face of injustice cannot be justified simply because domestic shortcomings exist elsewhere. Indeed, international diplomacy often requires states to advocate for principles that they themselves continue to struggle to realize fully.
However, there is a significant difference between advocacy and moral authority. The latter cannot be claimed; it must be earned. States that seek to exercise normative leadership are judged not only by the positions they articulate internationally but also by the extent to which those positions are reflected in their domestic governance.
This is particularly relevant in an era where international legitimacy increasingly rests upon governance performance rather than geopolitical alignment alone. The credibility of foreign policy has become inseparable from domestic policy outcomes. Governments can no longer compartmentalize external messaging from internal realities, as global media, civil society, and international institutions continually scrutinize the gap between rhetoric and practice.
Pakistan therefore possesses an opportunity that extends beyond hosting conferences or issuing diplomatic statements. By substantially investing in girls’ education, expanding women’s economic participation, strengthening legal protections against gender-based violence, improving maternal healthcare, and ensuring effective implementation of existing laws, Islamabad would not only improve the lives of its own citizens but also reinforce the legitimacy of its international advocacy.
Such reforms would transform Pakistan’s diplomacy from one based primarily on strategic interest to one supported by normative credibility. Rather than merely urging others to uphold women’s rights, Pakistan would be demonstrating how those rights can be progressively realized within a complex Muslim society facing comparable social and economic challenges. That example could prove more persuasive than any communiqué issued at an international conference.
There is also a broader lesson for international politics. Human rights diplomacy is most effective when it avoids the perception of selectivity. States often lose credibility when they condemn violations abroad while appearing reluctant to confront similar shortcomings at home. Consistency does not require perfection, but it does require a demonstrable commitment to continuous domestic reform.
Supporting Afghan women is therefore not inconsistent with addressing the challenges faced by Pakistani women. On the contrary, the two objectives should reinforce one another. A foreign policy rooted in universal human dignity derives its greatest strength from domestic example rather than diplomatic rhetoric.
Pakistan’s initiative at the OIC deserves recognition. But if Islamabad aspires to be a credible advocate for women’s rights in the Muslim world, its most persuasive argument will not be made in conference halls. It will be made in classrooms where every Pakistani girl can study, in workplaces where women participate without discrimination, and in communities where equality is protected not only by law but by lived reality. That is how states acquire the moral authority to shape international norms and how diplomacy gains enduring credibility.