When the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed in 1960, Pakistan was in a significantly stronger geopolitical position than today. Having good relationship with Western powers, economically ahead of its eastern neighbor, and enjoying robust ties with the Muslim world, Pakistan was emerging as a regional power. Kashmir was widely acknowledged as a disputed territory by major international forums, and United Nations resolutions prohibited any demographic changes in the region.
In negotiations with India over river waters, the western rivers should not have been part of the discussion at all. Since these rivers flow through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, international norms dictate that their natural flow should remain undisturbed until the dispute is resolved. Therefore, the focus of any water-sharing agreement should have been on the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej – where Pakistan had a legitimate claim as a lower riparian. Ideally, Pakistan should have sought a substantial share in these rivers. However, it negotiated from a position that was already the most favorable to India. At that time, India had no infrastructure to control the western rivers and no immediate capacity to divert or store their waters.
Its only realistic control lay over the eastern rivers – yet Pakistan handed over full rights to these rivers, effectively conceding everything India could have hoped for. Pakistan settled for a treaty that gave India exclusive rights over the eastern rivers and limited but significant rights over the western rivers. The treaty allowed India “non-consumptive” use of the western rivers – primarily for hydropower – and even permitted consumptive use for small-scale local agriculture.
Nonetheless, Pakistan signed the IWT – and while the treaty has since offered some protections, especially by preventing India from building large reservoirs on the Chenab, it has also cemented a deeply asymmetric water-sharing arrangement in India’s favor. Now, with increasing voices from India’s ruling elite calling for the treaty’s abrogation, the question arises: what would happen if the Indus Waters Treaty were terminated?
India’s Limited Ability to Block Water: Contrary to popular fears, India’s ability to completely choke Pakistan’s water supply is extremely limited – both technically and geographically. The Indus River, which originates in Tibet and flows through Indian-administered Ladakh, is virtually impossible to divert due to its sheer volume and terrain. Even if India were to construct a reservoir upstream, it would be unable to use the stored water for any significant agriculture.
The Jhelum River, though theoretically more vulnerable, lacks any major infrastructure in India for diversion. Constructing large-scale reservoirs or canals would take years, and even then, India’s capacity would be limited to controlling the timing of water flow – delaying it or releasing it en masse – rather than cutting it off entirely. Such tactics, while politically provocative and useful for domestic posturing, would be environmentally disastrous and diplomatically isolating.
The Chenab River is the most feasible target for Indian water manipulation. It originates in Himachal Pradesh and flows through Jammu before entering Pakistan. While India currently lacks diversion infrastructure here as well, future developments could allow India to gain partial control – though not complete dominance – over its flow. In the worst-case scenario, Pakistan could lose significant flow from the Chenab, but even that loss is not without alternatives.
Revival of Pakistan’s Claim on Eastern Rivers: What has not been adequately appreciated in Pakistan’s water discourse is that the termination of the Indus Waters Treaty could actually open the door for Pakistan to reassert its legal and moral claim to the eastern rivers. The IWT was the document that handed over exclusive rights to India on Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. If India chooses to unilaterally discard this treaty, it will also be discarding the very agreement that legitimizes its monopoly over these rivers.
Under international riparian law – particularly the Helsinki and Berlin Rules – upstream countries do not have absolute sovereignty over transboundary rivers. They are required to ensure equitable and reasonable use, prevent significant harm to downstream nations, and share data transparently. Without the IWT, India would be bound by these international norms, giving Pakistan a stronger basis to claim a share in the eastern rivers and to take disputes to international arbitration.
Even if India ignores arbitration, its global image would suffer. A country that discards internationally-brokered treaties and flouts established water-sharing principles cannot hope to retain the moral high ground, especially when it seeks membership in elite global forums.
Turning the Crisis into an Opportunity: At present, Pakistan survives primarily on the three western rivers. Losing the Chenab would be a serious setback, reducing total usable water by roughly a third. But with strategic planning and infrastructure investment, Pakistan could not only adapt but thrive.
A significant portion of the Chenab’s catchment area lies within Pakistan and receives high rainfall – about 1000 mm annually during the monsoon. Building storage infrastructure on seasonal streams like Nalla Deck and Nalla Bain can help Pakistan conserve monsoon rainwater and compensate for dry-season losses. Similarly, the northern regions of Pakistan, rich in glaciers and precipitation, offer enormous potential for sustainable water management – if properly harnessed.
Furthermore, eastern rivers like Ravi and Sutlej, though heavily used by India, still send substantial volumes of water into Pakistan during monsoon. For example, the Sutlej may bring in 80,000 to 150,000 cusecs of water at Head Sulemanki, sometimes peaking at 300,000 cusecs. The Ravi can deliver 30,000 to 80,000 cusecs at Head Balloki, occasionally reaching 150,000 cusecs. These rivers further accumulate huge quantities of water during their course to meet Indus. If effectively stored, this monsoon inflow in eastern rivers alone could fill a reservoir the size of Mangla.
However, topographical challenges prevent traditional dam construction in the flat terrain of Punjab. Innovative storage solutions – such as underground aquifer recharge wells, small-scale wetlands, and floodplain reservoirs – are urgently needed. India has already begun implementing such technologies, and Pakistan must follow suit to ensure water security.
Strategic Deterrence and Regional Implications: India must also consider the broader consequences of abrogating the IWT. If it sets a precedent by violating a World Bank-brokered treaty, it weakens its own standing in future negotiations with other upstream countries – particularly China. Several major Indian rivers, including the Brahmaputra and Sutlej, originate in Chinese-controlled territories. A breakdown of the IWT could embolden China to undertake similar actions, causing ripple effects across South and East Asia.
The northern plateaus of Pakistan receive over 1,000 mm of annual rainfall – more than sufficient to support year-round agriculture. Additionally, the Indus River carries massive volumes of water from Himalayan glaciers and regional rainfall. Therefore, the potential termination of the Indus Waters Treaty should not cause undue panic. Pakistan’s low national average rainfall is largely skewed by the vast expanse of Baluchistan, which receives minimal precipitation – often less than 200 mm annually, and in some areas as little as 50 mm. However, only a small portion of Balochistan is currently linked to the Indus system. This region would benefit more from developing localized water conservation and management infrastructure tailored to its arid climate.
For Pakistan, the end of the IWT is not just a challenge – it is an opportunity. The country can now revisit its historical claims to eastern rivers, seek international legal remedies, and push for a more equitable water-sharing regime under modern environmental norms. It can also initiate much-needed water reforms, invest in storage and conservation infrastructure, and reduce reliance on vulnerable upstream flows.
The Indus Waters Treaty, while a useful mechanism for decades, has long tilted in India’s favor. Its possible termination by India – though alarming – does not spell doom for Pakistan. Instead, it may allow Pakistan to reclaim rights it ceded under duress and to build a resilient, self-sufficient water management system.
Every crisis brings with it a window of opportunity. Whether we seize that opportunity or succumb to fear is entirely in our hands.
 was signed in 1960, Pakistan was in a significantly stronger geopolitical position than today.){kind=link}