In his book The ‘Life of Reason’, George Santayana says, “Those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it.” It’s what is happening with those in the corridor of power who make decisions on eradicating insurgency in Pakistan, and the former Tribal Areas in particular. In the meeting of the KP Apex Committee on December 20, 2024, it was decided that kinetic military operations would be launched in parts of district Bannu and Khyber. In June of the same year, Azm-e-Istehkam was announced, aimed at launching intelligence-based operations across the country, with a particular focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Three days after announcing military operations in Bannu and Khyber, Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur ruled out any such move on Monday. So, the question of whether these decision-makers are themselves clear about how to eradicate insurgency remains ambiguous. They are confused and have no clear vision on their priority list as to how to deal with this grave issue. The priority of the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is to march on Lahore, Pindi and Islamabad and get their leader out of jail. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has become the death world where the blood of innocent people is shed every day.
Referring back to George Satayana’s quote, multiple military operations have been launched across the length and width of former tribal areas, now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in the past, but terrorism seems to be increasing, as suggested by the statistical data. We have learned nothing from all these operations, such that these kinetic actions have only created resentment and trauma in the minds of those who were affected and displaced. The miseries through which these people, in the shape of IDPs and TDPs, have passed are unprecedented.
The first full scale-military operation was launched in Wana, South Waziristan, in March 2004, hunting down Uzbek and Chechen militants. This was followed by the Shakai Operation in April 2004. This military adventure was extended to North Waziristan in 2005. Operation Sherdil (Lion Heart) started in August 2008 in Bajaur. These kinetic actions were mainly focused on dismantling Al Qaeda and other foreign militants who had penetrated into the tribal areas with Afghan Taliban due to the offensive against them in Afghanistan by coalition forces.
Operation Rah-e-Rast was unveiled in Malakand Division in May 2009. It was aimed at dismantling the newborn Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and decapitating Tehrik-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in Swat. In Khyber, Operation Daraghlam (June 2008) and Operation Bia Daraghlam (September 2009) were carried out. Again, Operation Rah-e-Nijat was initiated in South Waziristan in September 2009, succeeded by operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014 in North Waziristan. Even though the dynamics of all these operations were different, the effects on the local people are unforgettable. Only operation Zarb-e-Azb displaced aroun Nine hundred thousand people from North Waziristan.
Pointing to the operation in Bannu, which has been decided in the KP Apex Committee, people took the streets the day after its announcement. In the last few months, Bannu saw some gigantic mass protests in the city, which show that people are no longer in a position to endorse another military adventure. In the Janikhel area of Bannu, the military operation had already been launched in June 2009. Since then, a heavy military presence has been seen in Janikhel, but the terrorists have been operating there without any fear. They have undertaken lethal attacks on military checkpoints. Local people of Janikhel staged a peaceful sit-in in March 2021 for one month to denounce militancy in their area. After failing to get their demonstrations heard by the authorities, they started marching on Islamabad but were blocked even from entering the National Highway adjacent to Bannu city.
The recounting of all these events suggests that the mistakes made are made, and taking civil society and local people into confidence is mandatory for the success of such endeavors. Without the support and say of the local people, all these adventures are destined to fail. These past kinetic actions have diminished the trust of the people in the law enforcement mechanism. Their social fabric has been distorted. They have been mentally exhausted, psychologically tortured, and economically deteriorated.
Provincial counter-terrorism mechanisms led by police forces should be preferred over military actions. The first advantage of this is that they can constructively engage locals in eradicating the menace of terrorism. Secondly, they are more compatible with local dynamics, which vary from one tribal district to another. But for that, provincial counter-terrorism department must be well equipped. This department is under-resourced and cannot counter the evolving strategies of militant groups efficiently. The militant groups have acquired lethal weapons with night-vision gadgets. They have snipers and other modern weaponry which are considered more unwieldy.
