The year 2025 appears to be a challenging one for India’s foreign policy and regional diplomatic posture. The recent four-day, unprovoked conflict with Pakistan, marked by Pakistan’s measured and professional military response, resulted in significant strategic embarrassment for New Delhi. Furthermore, Pakistan’s assumption of the presidency of the United Nations Security Council has dealt an additional blow to India’s long-standing narrative of uncontested regional hegemony. In light of these developments, Pakistan may find itself in a strategically advantageous position to propose a major diplomatic realignment: the restructuring of SAARC by excluding India and incorporating China. Such a move could potentially revitalize the forum’s relevance and effectiveness, especially considering it represents nearly one-quarter of the world’s population.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985 with seven founding members: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, whereas, Afghanistan joined as the eighth member in 2007. It has long suffered from political gridlock, despite having once been seen as a promising regional platform for communal progress. The main reason has been the long-standing animosity between its two biggest members, India and Pakistan, which has frequently prevented collaboration on important topics like connectivity, commerce, and climate action. The possibility of reorganizing SAARC without India, adding China as a partner, and establishing a new strategic and economic partnership among the remaining members, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan should be critically examined as Asia’s geopolitical currents change.
SAARC in spite of its potential, has mostly fallen short of its goals due to Indo-Pak tensions. For more than ten years, India has been supporting alternatives like BIMSTEC and the Indo-Pacific strategy to remove itself from SAARC, while its strategic objectives have been more closely linked with those of foreign actors like the U.S. and Quad members.
Rethinking regional integration is made possible by this standstill. A more balanced forum would be advantageous for the remaining SAARC countries, many of whom struggle with development, have cultural ties, and are looking for alternatives to Indian economic predominance. The organization may be able to overcome its present lethargy and concentrate on cooperative development, shared infrastructure, and strategic autonomy if the main cause of blockage (India) is removed.
It makes sense and is important to include China in a reorganized regional alliance, maybe called the “South Asia Cooperation Organisation” (SACO). Through strategic military cooperation and commercial investments, China has greatly increased its footprint in South Asia, establishing itself as a counterweight to Indian regional domination. The most robust China-South Asia partnership is with Pakistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship BRI project worth over $60 billion, includes roads, ports (Gwadar), energy plants, and industrial zones. Militarily, China is Pakistan’s largest arms supplier and has deepened defense collaboration, including joint exercises and naval cooperation.
China is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and has made investments in power plants, bridges, and highways. Notable developments include the Payra Port and the Padma Bridge Rail Link. China also strengthens defence ties by supplying naval gear and submarines. Chinese military cooperation and investment in Bangladesh have also increased.
Next is Sri Lanka where China made more than $12 billion in infrastructure investments, including in the roadways, Colombo Port City, and Hambantota Port. Beijing is still an important investor even if the lease of Hambantota to China sparked worries of a debt trap. China has given Sri Lanka ships, equipment, and military training.
Despite their economic reliance on both China and India, Bhutan and Nepal are starting to view China as a possible counterbalance. Same is the case of Afghanistan, in search for regional allies for peace and reconstruction in the post-U.S. period, China may prove to be a crucial ally.
China’s involvement might give the bloc financial clout, technological assistance, and diplomatic clout, enabling it to contend in a world that is becoming more multipolar. Furthermore, the regional imbalances brought forth by India’s increasing military and economic power could be corrected by a South Asian bloc led by China.
A restructured SAARC, after excluding India and incorporating China, has the potential to unlock significant opportunities for the region. Economically, it could pave the way for deeper integration through enhanced trade, harmonized tariffs, and the development of regional supply chains, thereby uplifting struggling economies. China’s substantial investment capacity could further drive industrialization and infrastructure development across member states. In terms of energy and connectivity, regional cooperation on hydropower, solar energy, and LNG pipelines could contribute to long-term energy security, while China’s expertise in logistics and infrastructure could facilitate the creation of strategic transport corridors linking Central Asia to the Indian Ocean through South Asia. On the security front, shared concerns such as extremism, climate change, and cyber threats could be addressed through a coordinated security framework, potentially modeled on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Lastly, for smaller states like Bhutan and Nepal, which often find themselves diplomatically constrained in an India-centric regional order, a new bloc could offer greater strategic autonomy and space to pursue their national interests on more equitable terms.
Although the plan to reorganize SAARC by adding China and removing India is audacious and progressive, there are serious obstacles and objections to it. The possible geopolitical retaliation from India, which would probably view such a move as openly unfriendly and destabilising and hence increase regional tensions, is one of the main worries. Another challenge is the internal divisions among smaller governments, like Bhutan and Nepal, who have traditionally maintained a precarious balance between China and India and may be hesitant to fully support either side.
Although Chinese investments have the potential to change the world, there are valid concerns that this reliance may result in unmanageable debt and strategic overreach, which are repeated in criticisms of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In addition, the legitimacy issue is a major concern: would a reorganized bloc be recognized by the world community as a legitimate SAARC replacement? Furthermore, given its ambiguous diplomatic status, how might Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime, be incorporated within such a framework? These difficulties highlight the necessity of thorough strategic preparation and widespread agreement for the success of such a regional realignment.
For regional collaboration, South Asia requires a practical, forward-thinking platform. It is both sensible and vital to look into other options if SAARC in its current configuration is unfeasible because of India’s overwhelming power and political stubbornness. The goals of its member states may be better served by a reorganised regional alliance that is more cohesive, leaner, and based on shared interests. China may provide the much-needed funding, strategic clout, and vision to transform South Asia into a genuinely interconnected and collaborative region.
