Kyiv, Ukraine – A flight from Moscow to the Pacific port of Vladivostok takes nearly nine hours — a domestic journey that spans two-thirds of Russia’s immense east-west stretch. Spanning more than 17 million square kilometers, Russia covers 11 percent of the world’s landmass — an area larger than China, India, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia combined.
Historically, this vastness has served as a defensive shield. From Napoleon’s doomed invasion in 1812 to the Nazi assault in 1941, invaders found themselves swallowed by Russia’s brutal geography and climate. But in the fourth year of the war in Ukraine, this same geographical expanse may be turning into a strategic vulnerability.
“Russia’s territory offers maximal capabilities for strikes,” quipped Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, former deputy chief of Ukraine’s general staff, in an interview with Al Jazeera.
Ukraine is proving that Russia’s size no longer guarantees safety. With a border stretching nearly 2,000 km, Ukraine has shown it can strike deep into Russian territory. Kyiv has carved out positions in Russia’s western Kursk and Bryansk regions, forcing Moscow to deploy tens of thousands of troops away from the frontlines.
Meanwhile, Soviet-era air defense systems scattered across western Russia are struggling to contain Ukrainian drone attacks. Increasingly sophisticated and often launched from within Russia itself or from neighboring countries, these drones have exposed the weakness of Moscow’s domestic defenses.
On June 1, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) launched Operation Spiderweb, a major drone strike that reached as far as Siberia. Drones believed to have been launched from a truck near the Belaya airbase in the Irkutsk region — nearly 4,000 km from Ukraine — struck strategic bombers. Similar attacks targeted the Amur region, and only a technical malfunction prevented damage at the Ukrainka airfield.
“Military bases, at home and in warzones, are now more vulnerable than ever to cheap, easily hidden, and quickly deployed weapons,” observed retired Australian general Mick Ryan.
From Blitzkrieg to Blowback
Russia entered the war in 2022 expecting swift success, emboldened by its 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ease with which it captured large parts of Donbas. It did not anticipate fierce resistance — nor the need to defend its own territory.
“They didn’t plan for a long war,” said Volodymyr Fesenko, head of Kyiv-based think tank Penta. “They didn’t expect Ukraine to strike back so effectively.”
Ukrainian drone attacks have since reached Moscow and its military-industrial suburbs. In May 2023, two drones exploded above the Kremlin. A year later, drone strikes have become routine, disrupting flights and keeping residents on edge.
“I cherish nights without air raid sirens,” said a woman living southwest of Moscow, speaking anonymously.
Civilian flights in western Russia are frequently delayed. Many travelers now prefer trains to northern Kazakhstan to avoid disrupted air routes.
Economic Weak Points and Oil Shock
Beyond military targets, Ukraine has turned to hitting the backbone of Russia’s economy — its oil infrastructure.
Strikes on refineries and pipelines have disrupted nearly 14 percent of Russia’s refining capacity, according to the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency. The effects have been immediate: a six-month ban on petrol exports, fuel prices rising by 30 percent, and emergency imports from Belarus.
The economic shock drew concern from the United States, wary of global oil price spikes. But Kyiv framed the attacks as a response to Russia’s systematic destruction of Ukraine’s energy grid.
Ukraine has also targeted Russia’s fragile railway network, vital in a country where roads are often in poor condition. On May 30, two bridges in Kursk and Bryansk collapsed, causing train derailments that killed seven and injured 69. Moscow labeled the incidents “terrorist attacks.”
Is It Enough?
Critics argue Ukraine’s strikes are still too limited and symbolic.
“Ukraine has long ignored ammunition depots and instead struck Moscow in ways that are more dramatic than strategically useful,” said Nikolay Mitrokhin of Germany’s Bremen University.
He noted that once Ukraine did begin targeting military depots, Russia responded by reinforcing defenses and relocating assets to more remote regions.
“The key is to destroy targets that are irreplaceable or cause massive losses — and I don’t see that happening yet,” Mitrokhin added.
However, General Romanenko believes Ukraine’s best days are ahead.
“We lack the tools — missiles and advanced drones — but once we have them, Putin will be more realistic. He only understands force.”
Conclusion: A Double-Edged Geography
Russia’s size has long been its strategic advantage — but in an age of drones, long-range strikes, and cyberwarfare, it also means more ground to defend and more infrastructure to protect.
As Ukraine refines its tactics and expands its reach, Moscow may be forced to rethink the myth of geographic invincibility. And for the first time in its modern history, the world’s largest country finds its own heartland under siege.
