Through the mediation of foreign interlocutors, the failed parleys between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Istanbul have been salvaged, yielding an extension in the ceasefire and a commitment to reconvene next week in Turkiye. The last-minute rescue-when Pakistani representatives, already at the airport, were recalled by the hosts-underscored how fragile yet necessary dialogue remains.
Islamabad’s core demand has not changed: that Afghan soil must not be used by militants targeting Pakistan. The Foreign Office’s cautiously optimistic tone, expressing hope for a “positive outcome” from the November 6 session, indicates an opening. The new ceasefire verification and border-peace mechanism can form the nucleus of a structured peace plan if followed up with consistency.
The Core Issue: Denial and Diffusion of Responsibility: The principal obstacle is Kabul’s ambiguous posture toward the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups. Pakistani officials insist that the Afghan Taliban, as the de facto rulers, have both the moral and administrative responsibility to stop cross-border terrorism. Taliban negotiators, however, have admitted that they “cannot fully control” the TTP, an admission that weakens their claim to statehood and governance capacity.
While Pakistan’s reported demand that the Taliban declare the TTP a fitna is symbolically appealing, it is diplomatically impractical. The ideological kinship between the Taliban and the TTP makes such an edict inconceivable. The focus must shift from theological labels to measurable behavioural outcomes-such as curbing cross-border infiltration, dismantling sanctuaries, and establishing verifiable intelligence mechanisms.
Moderation of the National Narrative: Pakistan must exercise narrative discipline at home and abroad. Afghanistan should never be portrayed as an enemy state. History, geography, and culture bind the two peoples far more deeply than current politics divide them. The Afghan nation must be distinguished from the Taliban regime, which seized power in Kabul by exploiting the vacuum left by an abrupt and clumsy U.S. withdrawal. The Afghan people remain our brothers and neighbours, not adversaries.
A moderated narrative rooted in respect and empathy will strengthen Pakistan’s moral standing and diplomatic reach. Intemperate language or populist vilification alienates ordinary Afghans and narrows future avenues of cooperation. Pakistan’s tone must emphasise shared faith, cultural kinship, and mutual dependence-the same bonds that once enabled social harmony and regional trade across the Durand Line.
Engaging Afghanistan Beyond the Taliban: For any sustainable peace, Pakistan must broaden its diplomatic outreach beyond the Taliban establishment. Afghanistan’s ethnic, tribal, and political diversity cannot be subsumed under a single authority. Islamabad should re-engage with Afghan political parties, tribal elders, women’s representatives, and technocrats who have been excluded from the current power structure. Their eventual integration through a peaceful, democratic process would lend legitimacy to future governance and dilute militancy’s monopoly over political space.
Such an approach would also signal to the Afghan people that Pakistan supports an inclusive and sovereign Afghanistan, not a client regime. With the support of Turkiye, Qatar, and the OIC, Pakistan could help foster intra-Afghan reconciliation through dialogue, constitutional reform, and a gradual return to representative politics.
Strategic Clarity and the Policy of Restraint: Pakistan must sustain its policy of strategic restraint. The nation cannot afford to engage in a two-front confrontation-managing pressure from India in the east while facing volatility on its western flank. Strategic discipline demands avoiding impulsive military gestures and focusing instead on diplomacy, deterrence, and selective engagement. This restraint is not weakness; it is a rational calculation rooted in the understanding that stability on both borders is indispensable for national recovery and economic revival.
Cultural, religious, and linguistic affinities between Pakistan and Afghanistan must continue to act as stabilising bridges, not fault lines. Centuries of shared faith, trade, and familial ties have created a moral and civilisational bond that politics alone cannot erase. Pakistan’s strategy should harness these affinities to promote people-to-people contact, educational exchange, and cross-border development projects, reaffirming that the two nations’ destinies are intertwined.
Regional Cooperation: From Bilateral Stalemate to Multilateral Solution: The Istanbul process offers an opportunity to transition from bilateral fragility to multilateral security. Militancy emanating from Afghan soil endangers more than Pakistan-it threatens China’s western provinces, Iran’s eastern regions, and Central Asia’s southern borders. Groups such as Al Qaeda, IS-K, and ETIM have regional ambitions; their eradication requires collective resolve.
Pakistan should therefore propose a Regional Compact on Counter-Terrorism and Border Security (RC-CTBS), bringing together China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkiye, Qatar, and the Central Asian republics. This forum could begin as an informal mechanism under the OIC or as an independent grouping focusing on intelligence fusion, border management, and counter-extremism initiatives supported by development assistance.
Within this broader umbrella, a Trilateral Security Coordination Cell among Pakistan, China, and Iran could synchronise operational intelligence, ensuring real-time cooperation against infiltration and trafficking networks. This would send Kabul a unified message: regional stability depends on dismantling militant sanctuaries and committing to transparent border governance.
The Road Ahead: If the Taliban wish to be recognised as a legitimate government, they must behave like one-by curbing cross-border militancy, protecting minorities, and engaging neighbours responsibly. For Pakistan, the challenge is to maintain composure, strategic restraint, and consistency. Peace cannot be imposed on Afghanistan; it must be constructed through inclusion, regional coordination, and narrative moderation.
The Istanbul process may yet become the foundation of a new regional architecture-one in which Afghanistan’s soil ceases to export instability, and Pakistan leads the way in crafting a cooperative, balanced, and humane approach to peace in the heart of Asia.
