Bangladeshis are currently focused on rising fuel prices as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to rattle global energy markets. The immediate concern is simple: how long will the strait remain partially blocked, and when will oil markets stabilize again?
But another, potentially more dangerous crisis linked to Hormuz has received far less attention – the threat to Asia’s fertilizer supply.
By now, it is increasingly clear that the conflict surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to end quickly. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of the world’s fuel shipments pass through the narrow waterway. Less discussed is the fact that an estimated 30 to 35 percent of global fertilizer trade also moves through the same route, much of it destined for Asia.
The implications are profound. Fertilizer shortages across Asia are likely to reduce agricultural output, intensify food insecurity, and drive food prices sharply upward in the months ahead.
The effects are already visible. Indonesia, one of the world’s largest rice-producing countries, has begun expanding its food reserves through additional wheat purchases, signaling growing concern over future supply disruptions.
Apart from China, few Asian nations currently possess the storage capacity or financial strength necessary to maintain large-scale fertilizer reserves. As fuel and fertilizer supply chains tighten simultaneously, Asia’s food system is entering an increasingly fragile phase.
The damage to agriculture is likely to emerge through two parallel pressures. First, farmers will struggle to maintain production because of shortages of fertilizer, electricity, diesel, and other energy-dependent agricultural inputs. Second, countries exporting food products are themselves experiencing rising production costs because of elevated fuel prices and fertilizer scarcity. As a result, import-dependent nations like Bangladesh will face substantially higher food import costs.
Bangladesh’s recent Boro rice season offered an early warning of what may lie ahead.
When cultivation began earlier this year, global fuel prices had not yet surged. The government continued fuel subsidies until shortly before harvest season. But diesel supplies, particularly for irrigation, were distributed under rationing systems, creating shortages that affected parts of the farming sector.
Some northern regions were partially protected because of solar-powered irrigation systems installed during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. Yet severe losses struck Greater Sylhet and Greater Mymensingh, major Boro rice-producing regions where mature crops could not be harvested in time before floodwaters submerged the fields. In some areas, roughly 75 percent of Boro rice production was reportedly destroyed.
Although the disaster has largely been framed as a natural calamity, local administrative failures also appear to have played a role. Floodwaters rose gradually, and warning signs were visible. With stronger preparation and faster response measures, at least part of the harvest might have been saved.
Now attention is turning to the upcoming Aman rice season, another critical pillar of Bangladesh’s food supply.
This time, however, the cultivation cycle begins under far more difficult conditions. Diesel prices have already increased. The fuels required for electricity generation are scarce and expensive in international markets. At the same time, shortages of liquefied natural gas have forced many of Bangladesh’s urea fertilizer factories to suspend operations.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar were major sources linked to Bangladesh’s phosphate and urea fertilizer production. Bangladesh imports more than 64 percent of its liquefied gas needs, much of which supports fertilizer production. More than 30 percent of those imports previously came from Qatar.
The scale of Qatar’s own energy crisis has therefore become deeply consequential for countries like Bangladesh.
At the time of writing, international reporting described Qatar – once among the world’s wealthiest energy exporters – as facing mounting economic distress. The country, which produces more than 77 million metric tons of liquefied gas annually and supplies a significant share of global demand, has reportedly halted exports for two months following severe damage to gas infrastructure.
If disruptions continue, fertilizer markets could remain unstable for years.
Urea prices in spot markets have already surged by roughly 160 percent. Rice-producing countries, including Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines, are scrambling to secure emergency supplies. According to regional market reports, fertilizer prices in some trading hubs jumped dramatically within a single day.
Under such volatile conditions, governments often struggle to purchase supplies through conventional tender systems. Suppliers shift toward spot markets where profits are higher, while direct state-to-state deals frequently come with political or economic conditions attached.
Many observers still believe the Iran conflict could end quickly if Donald Trump seeks a politically acceptable exit. But wars rarely end according to the calculations of those who begin them.
History repeatedly demonstrates that military conflicts evolve in unpredictable ways, often spreading economic consequences far beyond the battlefield itself. The effects of the Iran conflict have already expanded into energy markets, food systems, industrial supply chains and global trade networks.
Earlier, I argued that Iran’s emerging “energy war” could prove even more disruptive than the oil crises of the 1970s. Critics dismissed that comparison, noting that current oil indicators do not yet match the severity of those earlier shocks.
But one crucial difference separates today’s crisis from the 1970s.
At that time, the United States was itself heavily dependent on imported oil. Today, America is both a major energy exporter and a leading exporter of agricultural products. As oil prices rise and supply routes tighten, the United States stands to benefit economically even amid broader geopolitical instability.
Anyone familiar with geopolitical strategy could have anticipated that Iran might attempt to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz if directly drawn into war. It is therefore difficult to believe that such a scenario was absent from American strategic calculations.
While Iran uses Hormuz as leverage for self-preservation, Western energy companies have simultaneously benefited from higher oil prices. Their earnings and stock performances reflect those gains.
At the same time, many countries are increasingly being pushed toward purchasing American fuel and agricultural products at elevated prices. Even if Washington appears strategically challenged in some respects, it continues to gain from higher export revenues and a stronger dollar.
For Bangladesh, the consequences are becoming increasingly severe.
Agricultural production costs are already rising. Import costs are climbing alongside fuel, electricity, and fertilizer prices. Bangladesh is also purchasing wheat, cotton, yarn, and other commodities from the United States at significantly higher transportation and procurement costs.
Some analysts argue that these costly purchases stem partly from agreements made before the Iran conflict intensified. Yet global food prices outside the United States are also expected to continue rising rapidly.
The fuel crisis is simultaneously increasing edible oil production costs across Southeast Asia and Africa, reducing Bangladesh’s ability to source cheaper imports from alternative markets.
Poorer countries face additional structural risks. When fuel prices rise sharply, small farmers often scale back cultivation because transportation becomes unaffordable. In many cases, markets fail to reach rural producers altogether.
Bangladesh also faces a deeper long-term debate over infrastructure and energy policy.
A segment of economists and political commentators has repeatedly criticized projects such as the Jamuna Rail Bridge, Padma Rail Link, and Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant as unnecessary “white elephant” developments. Yet diesel-dependent transport systems are inherently expensive and become even more vulnerable during global energy crises.
Reliable rail networks powered by diversified electricity sources may ultimately prove essential for building resilient supply chains.
Around the world, countries are investing heavily in solar energy, battery technology, electric transportation, and alternative energy systems to reduce oil dependence. Bangladesh’s geography presents limitations for large-scale wind and solar expansion, leaving the country more reliant on nuclear and coal-based electricity generation.
But coal prices are also rising sharply as demand increases from large economies such as China and India.
The cumulative effects are already beginning to emerge across Bangladesh’s agricultural sector. Production costs for Aman rice, winter crops and year-round vegetable farming are expected to rise significantly. Export opportunities for perishable agricultural products may also shrink as transportation costs continue increasing.
The era of inexpensive global connectivity, driven by low-cost jet fuel and budget airlines, is beginning to wane. Many low-cost airlines are struggling financially, while even major carriers face mounting pressure.
For countries like Bangladesh, this creates the risk of a painful economic cycle: farmers may fail to receive fair prices for their products while urban middle-class consumers pay more for food.
Agriculture, one of the foundations of Bangladesh’s economy, is now facing enormous strain.
At the same time, the country’s garment industry – which accounts for roughly 85 percent of export earnings – is confronting its own crisis. Industry groups have warned that instability in fuel and electricity prices, as well as broader business confidence, is driving international orders elsewhere.
If exports weaken further, Bangladesh could face a dual shock: declining foreign earnings alongside rising unemployment among millions of low-income workers.
Meanwhile, remittance-dependent economies across South Asia are also becoming increasingly vulnerable.
For decades, labor migration to Gulf countries helped stabilize Bangladesh’s economy. But Qatar’s uncertainty, Saudi Arabia’s slowing mega-projects and broader regional instability are beginning to reduce overseas employment opportunities. Labor markets in Libya, Iraq and Syria had already deteriorated long ago, while access to Malaysia’s labor market remains restricted.
The effects are visible elsewhere in South Asia as migrant workers return home and remittance flows weaken.
Bangladesh may not remain insulated for long.
At the same time, the government has acknowledged spending billions of additional dollars on fuel imports precisely when foreign currency reserves are under mounting pressure.
Yet even amid these economic strains, authorities are preparing to introduce a new pay scale for government employees beginning in July.
That decision comes as private-sector businesses struggle, agricultural costs rise and remittance inflows weaken. The result could be further inflationary pressure at a time when many workers are already facing job losses, irregular salaries and declining returns on savings.
For many ordinary citizens, rising food prices have already made income levels and interest rates almost irrelevant. Large numbers of people can no longer afford protein and other essential foods.
The energy crisis may dominate headlines today. But the deeper threat approaching Bangladesh appears increasingly likely to come from food insecurity.
In moments like these, economic stability, international financial support, and competent state leadership become critical. Political instability and extreme austerity measures rarely provide durable solutions.
For now, one can only hope that no poet will once again be forced to ask:
“Where shall I find food in the scorching afternoon?”
