The violent exchanges along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border between 10 and 12 October 2025 have reopened one of the most dangerous flashpoints in South Asia.
Both Kabul and Islamabad claim to have inflicted heavy casualties on each other’s troops during the nocturnal clashes. Whatever the disputed numbers, the escalation reveals the gravity of Pakistan’s security dilemma: a militant threat emanating from Afghan soil, an emboldened Taliban regime gaining diplomatic space, and a potentially coordinated sub-conventional nexus involving India and Afghanistan.
For Pakistan, the strategic question is not whether to respond – but how.
A reaction driven purely by force risks regional isolation; excessive restraint may invite more provocations. The answer lies in balance: maximum diplomatic pressure first, and calibrated kinetic action only as lawful, proportionate self-defence.
The Taliban government, still unrecognised by the United Nations, has nonetheless achieved gradual normalization.
Moscow has moved toward formal recognition and exchanged ambassadors; Beijing maintains a functioning embassy; and New Delhi has now upgraded its presence in Kabul to ambassador level, hosting Afghan diplomats in India. During the recent visit of Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister to Delhi, both sides issued a joint statement critical of Pakistan – a symbolic alignment that cannot be ignored.
This diplomatic re-entry allows the Taliban to claim legitimacy while evading accountability for harbouring groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
It also complicates Islamabad’s efforts to mobilize collective pressure against cross-border terrorism.
Beyond the visible border skirmishes lies a more complex danger – the sub-conventional threat spectrum.
Pakistan has long accused external intelligence services of sponsoring or enabling separatist militancy within its borders. The evolving Delhi-Kabul relationship amplifies this concern.
Analysts in Islamabad increasingly point to what is termed the “Doval Doctrine” – an Indian strategic posture said to emphasise offensive intelligence operations, proxy leverage, and psychological warfare to achieve regional aims below the threshold of open conflict.
There is credible evidence and intelligence reporting suggesting foreign support to separatist outfits such as the Baloch Liberation Army and other anti-state actors.
Moreover, allegations of cross-border extrajudicial actions have added a new dimension. The murder of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada and reported foiled plots in the US have drawn public accusations against Indian operatives, revealing a disturbing trend of states projecting coercive power abroad.
For Pakistan, these episodes underscore how sub-conventional strategies are being normalised as instruments of statecraft – a pattern that could manifest through Afghan territory as a proxy front against Pakistan.
Pakistan’s first line of defence must be diplomacy armed with evidence.
Islamabad should compile and circulate a comprehensive dossier linking recent attacks to facilitation from Afghan soil – with verifiable intelligence, satellite imagery, communication intercepts, and financial trails.
This dossier should be quietly shared with key partners – Beijing, Moscow, Washington, Riyadh, Ankara, London – to establish credibility before the media war begins.
The aim is to frame the issue as one of regional security and international law, not merely bilateral hostility.
Early engagement reduces the risk of third-party narratives painting Pakistan as the aggressor.
Armed with evidence, Pakistan should pursue a UN-anchored diplomatic and legal track.
Citing obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), Islamabad can seek a targeted Chapter VII measure imposing asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes on individuals or entities supporting the TTP.
If a permanent-member veto blocks action, the General Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” mechanism can be invoked to mobilise a broad political coalition.
Parallel financial measures – through the Financial Action Task Force and major correspondent-bank jurisdictions – can further constrict militant funding networks.
This route preserves legitimacy and internationalises responsibility while buying time for domestic stabilisation.
Pakistan must also contest Kabul’s and Delhi’s narratives.
The message should be consistent: diplomatic engagement with the Taliban is acceptable only when accompanied by verifiable action against cross-border terrorism.
Islamabad should warn partners that unconditional normalisation risks rewarding impunity and undermining counter-terror commitments.
A professional information strategy – briefing journalists, think-tanks, and parliaments abroad – can reinforce this position.
Diplomacy is not merely about meetings; it is also about narrative dominance.
Pakistan must keep its deterrence intact – without over-reaction.
This requires better surveillance and fortification of border posts, quick-reaction capabilities, and precision responses only when evidence of armed provocation is irrefutable.
Any kinetic action should conform to the principles of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy under international law.
A transparent policy of “limited, defensive retaliation” would deter aggression while demonstrating restraint – maintaining Pakistan’s image as a responsible regional actor.
Diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime by key powers, combined with India’s intelligence activism, risks institutionalising a two-front sub-conventional challenge to Pakistan.
Meeting that challenge demands more than military reaction.
It requires resilient governance in Pakistan’s own border regions, investment in socio-economic integration of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and counter-narratives to extremist recruitment.
A robust internal front is the surest antidote to external subversion.
Even as Pakistan fortifies its border and diplomatic posture, it must keep de-escalation ladders open.
Quiet intermediaries – Qatar, China, the OIC, or UN envoys – can facilitate communication to prevent small clashes from spiralling into prolonged conflict.
Effective crisis management demands that both escalation and disengagement options are clearly defined.
The October clashes remind Islamabad that security is now fought on two simultaneous fronts – the visible frontier of guns and posts, and the invisible frontier of narratives, proxies, and legitimacy.
A purely military response would feed the cycle of violence; mere diplomacy would embolden adversaries.
Pakistan’s success will depend on its ability to blend diplomacy, law, and limited deterrent force into a coherent strategy.
By mastering that balance, Pakistan can safeguard its sovereignty, expose the costs of proxy warfare, and reassert itself as a rational, law-abiding actor in a region drifting toward dangerous normalization of sub-conventional conflict.
