A delegation of Foreign Ministers from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt met at Islamabad on March 29, 2026, to discuss potential de-escalation options in West Asia. The meeting particularly focused on evolving tensions and military escalation between the Iran, Israel and United States in the Middle East and the Gulf region. As an established rule of thumb for mediation, unity, impartiality, trust and leverage over both parties is mandatory. However, in this case, certain issues are overlapping the main cause, for example conflict of interest and degree of influence between the belligerent and mediating states which making cohesive action nearly impossible.
Saudi Arabia (KSA) is the leading state and possess a significant influence among the Islamic world. However, provides the most financial leverage to the United States and is also a trusted security partner of US. However, its practicality is hindered by a fundamental contradiction: it is seeking a US defense pact and normalization with Israel (conditional on a pathway to Palestinian statehood), while simultaneously trying to de-escalate with Iran (via the 2023 Beijing-brokered détente). Riyadh cannot guarantee Iranian compliance without alienating Washington, nor can it guarantee US restraint without undermining its own normalization goals. Its role would be less “neutral guarantor” and more “anxious stakeholder.”
Turkiye, possesses unique diplomatic channels to both Iran and the West via NATO, despite of competition in Syria and Iraq. However, its practicality is compromised by its own agenda. Turkiye has used military force against US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and maintains a transactional relationship with Iran. Furthermore, its recent rapprochement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia is fragile. For Washington, Turkiye’s role as a “guarantor” is suspect due to sanctions disputes (S-400s) and differing strategic aims in the Eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus.
Pakistan, being the only nuclear power in the group also has a different influence in the region. Pakistan shares a long border, gas pipeline agreement and historical ties with Iran, however, also a non-NATO ally of United States since long. However, Pakistan’s practicality is severely limited by its domestic economic crisis and its unique geopolitical baggage. Pakistan’s government has historically been aligned with the US, yet its public opinion is staunchly anti-Israel. More critically, Pakistan does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state. For Israel and the US, a country that refuses diplomatic recognition cannot serve as a credible neutral venue or guarantor for a binding security agreement. Pakistan’s participation would be viewed by Tel Aviv as inherently biased.
Egypt is enjoying close relations with the Israel since Camp David accord and a trusted security coordinator with the US and Israel in connection of conflicts in Gaza and Sinai. However, Cairo’s practicality is limited by its economic dependence on Gulf aid (Saudi/UAE) and US military aid. Egypt’s primary interest is containing Hamas and securing the Philadelphi Corridor, not necessarily guaranteeing Iran’s nuclear restraint. Iran views Egypt with deep suspicion due to Egypt’s close intelligence cooperation with Israel.
In this situation, the question arises that, who will be the trustable Guarantee for both sides? In high-stakes negotiations involving Iran’s nuclear program or regional de-escalation with the US and Israel, “guarantees” must be either material (economic sanctions relief, security pacts) or military (deterrence). No single country in this quartet can provide the necessary guarantees to the both sides. Iran is looking for the guarantee of, no regime change efforts, no pre-emptive strikes on nuclear facilities and civilian infrastructure, and permanent or sustainable removal of sanctions. Whereas, US and Israel are seeking guarantees for, non-possession of nuclear weapon, no disruption of global shipping lines and halt on proliferation of ballistic missiles to proxies (Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas).
Can the Quartet guarantee this for both parites? The imaginable answer is No!
An independent analysis reveals that only US can lift sanctions from Iran, but Saudi Arabia and Turkiye can’t bind the US Congress to do so. On the other hand, none of four countries has influence over Israel to bind them over unprovoked military actions. Israel has historically proven (e.g., Osirak 1981, Syria 2007) that it acts unilaterally when it perceives an existential threat, regardless of the objections of regional allies.
In contrast, Iran views its missile program and support for proxies as non-negotiable aspects of its national security doctrine. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are victims of Houthi attacks, cannot “guarantee” that Iran will abandon this doctrine.
Interestingly, Riyadh has been seeking a defense guarantee from the US precisely because it cannot defend itself against Iranian missiles or proxies. At the same time, KSA is also in a defense agreement with Pakistan as well and Pakistan is agreed to provide its Nuclear Umbrella to Riyadh, in case of any aggression. In this scenario, a guarantor cannot be a party that is itself seeking a protector.
The choice of Islamabad is symbolic but impractical for a direct US-Iran negotiation. The United States and Israel do not have formal diplomatic missions in Pakistan that can handle such sensitive, high-level back-channeling. Whereas Pakistan is currently navigating a fragile political and economic recovery under IMF programs. Its ability to host a complex, multi-polar negotiations, involving sworn enemies (Iran and Israel) without risking domestic political instability is questionable. Pakistan’s insistence on keeping Israel out of the room (given its non-recognition policy) makes it impossible for the US to take the negotiations seriously, as the US coordinates every Iran move with Israel.
As a conclusion, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia represents a powerful cross-section of the Islamic world capable of applying pressure on Iran to de-escalate, however, they are structurally incapable of serving as guarantors. The quartet is not a unified security bloc like NATO or the GCC+. They have competing interests, like Turkiye and Saudi Arabia are rivals for leadership; Egypt is beholden to Saudi and US aid; Pakistan is a wildcard with no ties to Israel.
A negotiation to resolve the US-Iran-Israel conflict cannot be mediated solely by third parties while excluding the primary antagonists from the room. For guarantees to be credible, the US and Iran must negotiate directly; the quartet’s role could only be to provide incentives (e.g., economic integration, reconstruction funds) rather than guarantees. Ultimately, the only entity that can guarantee compliance for the US is the US President (subject to Congressional whims), and the only entity that can guarantee Iranian compliance is the Supreme Leader. For such a negotiation to succeed, it would require the direct, simultaneous involvement of the United States (to provide security guarantees to partners) and perhaps China or Russia (to provide economic guarantees to Iran), rendering the quartet a supporting actor rather than the lead guarantor.
